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Abstract 
 
Decentralization of government with property tax financing is the standard recipe for public 
sector reform. Fiscal competition is assumed to stimulate efficiency and hold down the tax 
level. Property taxation offers additional incentives for efficiency. We study the incentive 
mechanisms involved using data for decentralized governments and in a setting where they 
can choose to have property taxation or not. The empirical analysis addresses whether fiscal 
competition and political control problems influence the choice of having property taxation. 
The results indicate that both incentive mechanisms are relevant and consequently support the 
standard advice. Fiscal competition generates a distinct geographic pattern in local taxation 
and political fragmentation seems to motivate property taxation to control common pool 
problems. The main methodological challenge handled concerns spatial interaction with 
discrete choice.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Control problems and rigidities in public sector service provision have motivated search for 
incentive mechanisms to stimulate efficient provision. Decentralization to local governments 
with property taxation is the standard World Bank - IMF advice to developing and transition 
economies (re)forming the public sector. De Mello (2004) summarizes the arguments and the 
cross-country evidence. Recent empirical evidence on the design fiscal decentralization 
emphasize more conventional economic motivations, notably Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) 
and Panizza (1999). The empirical research on the effects of decentralization typically 
addresses the size of government (initiated by Oates, 1985, overview by Rodden, 2003). We 
offer an alternative empirical investigation into the incentive mechanisms involved in this 
design, fiscal competition and property value feed-back to control ‘Leviathan’ government.  
 
Given the incentives involved, we study a key decision of local governments themselves: the 
choice of having property taxation or not. The situation in Norway facilitates the analysis 
since local governments can choose to have property taxation given regulated income tax 
revenue and grants. Our approach is to investigate whether the local choice is affected by 
fiscal competition and political control problems. If local governments themselves take these 
factors into account, we can assume that they are important in practice. The results confirm 
that the use of property taxation reflects fiscal competition and political fragmentation and 
consequently that incentives matter. 
 
Fiscal competition is the major incentive mechanism of decentralized government. The 
starting point of the literature on tax competition is the concern that mobility leads to 
underprovision of public services Tax base mobility implies too low taxes because of fiscal 
externalities. Later the attention has moved to yardstick competition as an additional channel 
of fiscal discipline. Wilson and Wildasin (2004) present a recent overview and with 
discussion of the empirical literature. We read the empirical studies as an overwhelming 
support of the existence of strategic interaction at the local government level, and that both 
tax base mobility and information asymmetries may be of importance. We investigate the 
importance of fiscal competition for the decision to have property taxation utilizing 
Norwegian data. The analysis implies some econometric challenges of spatial models with 
discrete dependent variables that are addressed. 
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Brennan and Buchanan (1978, 1980) introduced the design of tax systems as incentive 
mechanism. Their main approach is the control of' 'Leviathan' government, but they also 
discuss incentives of public service provision. In particular they show how governments are 
stimulated to supply public services when the tax base is complementary to the provision of 
the public services. The more recent literature on tax incentives have concentrated on property 
taxation. Oates (2001) summarizes the arguments that property taxes facilitate efficient local 
fiscal decision-making. When property taxation can help control government officials, 
property taxation will be more desired the larger the imperfections of the political decision 
making process. We expect that voters will be more eager to have property taxation when the 
political system is inefficient. In the tradition of Roubini and Sachs (1989), the main source of 
fiscal inefficiencies is political fragmentation. Perotti and Kontoupolos (2002) offer an 
updated evaluation of fragmented government. The stylized fact is that political fragmentation 
leads to excessive spending and fiscal imbalance. This literature leaves an open question what 
voters do to overcome the consequences of political fragmentation. Redesign of political 
institutions is an obvious alternative. But since this is cumbersome and with no easy 
alternatives, it seems natural to look for alternative mechanisms. We relate the decision to 
have property tax to the degree of political fragmentation in the local government. 
 
Given the ‘Leviathan’ government challenge and the favorable characteristics of the property 
tax, it is of interest to analyze how local governments evaluate property taxation. Our data 
allow us to study how the local decision to have property taxation is influenced by fiscal 
competition and political control problems.  The approach is inspired by the literature on 
positive analysis of tax structure. Inman (1989) introduce a political economy model of the 
local decision to tax. Hettich and Winer (1988) more broadly advocate the understanding of 
tax structure as a political equilibrium. We include their emphasis on political characteristics, 
since this is important for the functioning of property taxes as an incentive mechanism to 
control government. We extend their frameworks by embedding the analysis in a spatial 
interaction model. 
 
The empirical setting is a large number (434) of local governments supplying public services 
basically financed by central government grants and regulated income taxes. Property taxes 
represent a potential additional source of revenue at the margin, and the decision to have 
residential property taxes is local. The property tax design is specified by national law, but the 
local governments decide to have it, and they set the tax rate within a band and arrange the 
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assessment of housing values. Local governments are political systems with local councils 
elected from party lists. The local decision to have the property tax is investigated in this 
paper. 
 
Section 2 presents the empirical context and the data. The empirical approach is discussed in 
section 3 and section 4 discusses spatial econometric issues. The discrete choice to have 
property taxation (probit analysis) is analyzed in section 5, while section 6 expands the 
analysis to look at the revenue generation (tobit analysis). Section 7 offers concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Local property taxation in Norway 
 
Local governments in Norway can choose to have residential property taxation. The financing 
of the local governments is highly centralized, and more than 80% of the revenues are 
generated from central government grants and regulated income taxes. The grants are 
distributed as block grants and are based on objective criteria, partly as tax equalization and 
partly as spending equalization. The income tax revenue is shared between local, county and 
central governments with the maximum income tax rate at the local level set by the central 
government. All local governments apply the maximum income tax rate and their grants and 
income tax revenue consequently appear as given from above. Local governments have some 
discretion in setting fees for infrastructure services and some welfare services, but also the 
fees are regulated and with the general rule that they can only cover costs. Borge (1995) and 
Borge and Rattsø (2005) analyze the fee setting, and Carlsen et al. (2005) investigate the role 
of mobility for the determination of fees for infrastructure services. The choice of having 
property tax is the key local decision to tax. Borge and Rattsø (2004) analyze determinants of 
the tax structure, the mix of revenues from property taxation and fees. We will have a closer 
look at the discrete choice of having property tax. 
 
The property tax is defined by law (of June 6, 1975) and the decision to have the tax is fully 
in the hands of the local government. The law describes the property that can be taxed, the tax 
base assessment, and restrictions to the tax rate. Residential property taxation is restricted to 
urban areas, that is towns and or areas under construction that will appear as towns. This 
definition of an urban area is not very clear, and there are many court cases where property 
owners have argued that the area under taxation is not urban.  
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Local governments in Norway are heterogeneous with respect to population size, with many 
small municipalities up valleys and along fjords. The median municipality has about 4.500 
inhabitants, while the average is a population of 10.000. Since we study the choice of having 
property tax, we must exclude local governments that cannot have since they have no urban 
areas. Among the 434 local governments in all, we exclude local governments with less than 
2.500 inhabitants and the capital, Oslo. Utilizing data for 2001 this leaves us with a data set 
consisting of 301 local governments where 105 of them levy residential property taxation.1 It 
follows that 3 local governments with property taxation are excluded because of our general 
criteria to represent the existence of urban areas (see Appendix Table 1). 
 
All local governments have an assessment of house values related to the income tax and the 
assessment value on average is about 30% of the market value. The locals differ in their 
assessment, although most of them have assessed values in the area of 15-40% of market 
value. In addition to differences in the assessment practice, there are also variations in 
deductions (14 out of 108 local governments use different forms of deductions). The property 
tax rate is restricted to the interval 0,2% and 0,7% of the assessed housing value. 74 of the 
108 local governments with property taxation apply the maximum rate, and the average tax-
rate is 0,61%. In addition to the residential property tax about 120 other local governments 
have a commercial property tax. This is basically a tax on electric power stations and part of a 
system of distributing the resource rent of electricity based on waterfalls. The commercial 
property tax is excluded here. 
 
Our main focus is the existence of residential property taxation, but in an extension we will 
look at the determination of property tax revenue. Based on survey data we calculate how 
much a standardized household will have to pay in property taxation in all of the 108 local 
governments that levy residential property taxation in 2001. The standardized house is 
assumed to be 160 sq. meters with a market value of 1 million Norwegian kroner (USD 
160 000). The average effective tax for the standardized house is 1820 NOK (USD 290), 
varying from 4312 NOK (Sarpsborg) to 130 NOK (Arendal). A majority of the local 
governments (57 out of 108) levy effective taxes between 1001 and 2000 NOK.  
 
                                                 
1 Data for two local governments are missing. 
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3.  Empirical modelling 
 
We study a situation where local governments can choose to have property taxation or not. 
Assuming that the property tax is regulated (as the case in Norway), this can be analyzed as a 
discrete choice between two alternatives: with and without the tax. The dummy-variable 
dptax is our main dependent variable, and dptax = 1 when the local government has 
residential property taxation. In an extension we will look at determinants of property tax 
revenue (ptax). 
 
In the conventional understanding of the role of taxation, the benefits of the increased public 
services financed by the new tax must be evaluated against the costs of raising the new 
revenue. No property taxation allows higher private consumption and lower public 
consumption compared to the alternative with property taxation. Local governments provide 
services basically financed by grants or lump sum taxes, but with property taxation as a 
possible marginal source of funds. A standard fiscal demand model of the decision to levy 
property taxation emphasize two economic determinants, the private income level (y ) and 
the central government grants (G). The private income level also works as a proxy for the 
property tax base here, since data about property valuation at the local level are not available. 
Consistent with the many studies of local public choice in the Scandinavian countries, we 
include the socialist share of the local council (SOC) as a measure of ideological orientation. 
Socialist oriented municipalities tend to have higher tax and spending levels. Petterson (2004) 
have analyzed the importance of socialist orientation in a discontinuity setting. 
 
The first extension of this standard demand understanding is fiscal competition whereby the 
choice of property taxation takes into account the existence of property taxation in 
neighboring communities. In general form, yardstick competition implies that the existence of 
property tax in community i (dptaxi) depends on the existence of property taxation in all other 
N communities and a vector x of other determinants: 
 
 1 1 1 ,( ,.., , ,.., )i i i i N idptax dptax dptax dptax dptax dptax− += x , (1) 
 
As discussed in the introduction, fiscal competition may result from tax mobility or 
comparison with neighbors. In the case of property taxation, which is highly politically visible 
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and with low mobility of the tax base, yardstick competition is a potentially important 
mechanism. Yardstick competition implies that voters make use of information about the 
political choices in neighboring local governments. The decisions of the neighbors have an 
information externality, they represent information to evaluate the performance of own 
government. It follows that voters condition their electoral choices on the relative fiscal 
performance of their own versus neighboring local governments. The understanding of the 
mechanism was first developed by Salmon (1987) and formalized by Besley and Case (1995). 
Bordignon et al. (2003) and Allers and Elhorst (2005) have shown the importance of yardstick 
competition for property taxation in Italy and in the Netherlands respectively. 
 
The main econometric challenge of estimating the discrete choice of having property taxation 
is the simultaneous determination of property taxation in all communities that follow from the 
strategic interaction. The right hand side property tax dummies of the neighbors are 
endogenously determined. Case et al. (1993) innovated the econometric investigation of this 
type of strategic interaction in a study of the expenditure levels among US state governments. 
In addition to the apparent simultaneity problem, we also take into account that the discrete 
choice is best understood in a latent variable model. This is elaborated in section 4. 
 
The second extension of the fiscal demand model includes local political control problems 
that may motivate having property taxation as an incentive mechanism. The general Brennan-
Buchanan argument is developed in the context of property taxation by Glaeser (1996). It is 
based on the complementarity between local service provision and tax base via housing 
values. Gordon and Wilson (2000) and Wilson and Gordon (2003) analyze similar 
relationships between voters and officials emphasizing government waste (or slack) and in the 
context of tax competition. Property taxation may reduce waste since the officials will take 
into account the feedback via property values. Hoxby (1999) provides a theoretical framework 
to analyze costs and efforts in schools and introduces property taxation as a disciplining 
device. Property taxation links school quality to school financing and helps control costs and 
efforts in schools. More broadly Fischel (2001) introduces the concept of 'homevoters', 
homeowners whose voting is guided by their concern for home values. Since homeowners are 
locked into the locality, they focus on local government behavior and consequently the 
housing market disciplines local decisions. Brunner and Sonstelie (2003) supply empirical 
evidence that homeowners vote to protect their property values (voucher issue in California). 
The incentive effects of property taxation to hold down costs are shown by Borge and Rattsø 
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(2003) comparing local governments with and without property tax in Norway. Fiva and 
Rønning (2005) find favorable incentive effects of property taxation on school efficiency in 
Norway. 
 
In the empirical part we concentrate on political fragmentation. An extensive literature on 
fiscal policy outcomes based on Roubini and Sachs (1989) has shown the importance of 
political fragmentation for fiscal imbalance and the level of spending and taxation. Perotti and 
Kontopoulos (2002) offer a recent documentation. In the Norwegian local government setting, 
Kalseth and Rattsø (1998) have shown how fragmentation is associated with higher 
administrative costs and Borge and Rattsø (2005) show that fragmentation increases the fee 
level. We hypothesize that local governments with more fragmented political system is more 
likely to have property taxation.  
 
Political fragmentation is measured by a Herfindahl-index of party fragmentation of the local 
council. When SHp is the share of representatives from party p, then the Herfindahl index for 
party fragmentation (HERF) is given by:  
 
 
P
2
p 1
HERF = SH p
=
∑ . (2) 
 
The Herfindahl-index is generally given by 1/P, when the representatives are equally divided 
among P parties. The index has maximum value of 1 when there is only one party in the 
council. The Herfindahl index ranges from 0.14 to 0.60 in our sample, with a sample mean of 
0.24.  
 
The data are documented in Appendix Table 2. As control variables in all regressions we 
include population size, a measure of the income distribution (ratio of median to mean 
income), the age distribution of the population (below 5 years of age, 6-15 and 66+), and 
share of the population in rural areas. 
 
4. Spatial econometric issues 
 
Different approaches for undertaking estimation and inference in linear regression models 
with spatial effects are well developed. However, spatial models with discrete dependent 
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variables have received little attention in the literature and empirical implementation of such 
models is an area of active research. Estimation of spatial discrete models yields contrary to 
linear spatial models a non-spherical variance-covariance matrix. An important consequence 
of the complex variance-covariance structure is that the error term will be heteroskedastic 
(Anselin, 2002). This renders standard probit or tobit estimation inconsistent. The underlying 
problem is the (potential) interdependence in the endogenous variable giving rise to 
simultaneity. To solve this problem one needs to rely on a spatial latent variable approach.2 
Following Fleming (2004), in econometric form the underlying latent model specification 
with spatial dependence can be expressed as: 
 
 ρ= + +dptax* Wdptax* xβ u , (3) 
 
The observed variable, dptaxi, is a dummy variable identifying local governments with 
residential property taxation and dptaxi* is it’s unobserved latent counterpart. The observed 
dptaxi equals unity when dptaxi*>0 and is zero otherwise. W is a symmetric 301x301 weight 
matrix, with zeros in the diagonal and with elements wij different from zero if the two local 
governments are considered to be neighbors. X is a matrix of property tax determinants of 
every local government, β is a vector of parameters and u is a vector of error terms which we 
for now assume to be normally distributed with homoscedastic variance: 
 
 2(0, )uN σu ∼ . (4) 
 
The spatial weights matrix, W, is determined apriori and can be considered as part of local 
government i's basic characteristics. In this analysis we follow the literature on fiscal 
competition and choose a definition of neighbors as municipalities with a common border. Wij 
= 1/mi for all municipalities that are contiguous to municipal i, where mi is the number of 
observations that are contiguous to municipal i. Wdptax* is a weighted average of the 
propensity for neighboring local governments to levy property taxation. ρ captures interaction 
in the latent variable, the propensity to levy property taxation increases (decreases) as 
neighbor’s propensity to levy property taxation increases (decreases). We expect ρ to come 
                                                 
2 Other studies which pursue different versions of the spatial latent variable approach include Case (1992), 
Pinkse and Slade (1998), Holloway et al. (2002) and Klier and Mcmillen (2005). 
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out positive and statistically significant if fiscal competition is a relevant aspect of the 
property tax determination. 
 
It should be noticed that the strategic interaction in (3) technically implies that it is the 
neighbor’s latent variable (Wdptax*) that matters for local government i, and not neighbors’ 
observed decisions (Wdptax). The straightforward formulation of the interaction is that the 
observed existence of property taxation depends on the observed property taxation of the 
neighbors ( ρ= + +dptax Wdptax xβ u ), while a formulation where the propensity to levy 
property taxation depends on the observed property taxation of the neighbors is an 
intermediate case ( ρ= + +dptax* Wdptax xβ u ). We estimate the standard probit model with 
an exogenous spatial lag as an alternative to the latent variable model. As will come clear, the 
strength of the interaction estimated is seriously affected by the formulation applied. As Klier 
and McMillen (2005:8) point out, only the latent model represents algebraically consistent 
handling of the endogeneity problem.  
 
Our spatial autoregressive probit model (SARP) given by (3) yields correlation between 
Wdptax* and the disturbances, even when the latter are iid. The endogeneity problem can 
easily be seen from writing (3) on reduced form (assuming that ( - )ρI W is invertible): 
 
 -1 -1=( - ) ( - )ρ ρ+dptax* I W xβ I W u , (5) 
 
implying that 
 
 -1 2(( ) ) ( - ) uE ρ σ= ≠Wdptax* u' W I W 0 . (6) 
 
Non-spatial probit estimation yields in this case biased and inconsistent estimators. Note that 
contrary to the linear case, it is complicated to utilize standard Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
estimation of ρ because the SARP specification given by (3) introduces a non-spherical 
variance-covariance matrix given by: 
 
 [ ] 1 2' uρ ρ σ−=Cov(u) (I - W)(I - W) . (7) 
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The error terms will consequently be homoscedastic only if ρ=0. Contrary to models with 
continuous dependent variables, the discrete dependent model with heteroscedastic error 
terms yields inconsistent estimates. There are basically two potential remedies to this 
problem. Some authors, such as Case (1992) and Pinkse and Slade (1998), have proposed to 
ignore the off-diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix and focus on the 
heteroskedasticity induced by spatial dependence. This method yields consistent, but not fully 
efficient estimates of the spatial probit model. To obtain consistent and fully efficient 
estimators, one has to deal with multidimensional integrals (Anselin, 2002). Fleming (2004) 
presents a survey of different simulation techniques available for solving this problem. He 
concludes that the Bayesian approach based on Lesage (2000) is the most flexible method. 
We follow the Bayesian approach when empirically analyzing fiscal competition in section 5 
and 6.3 
 
The Bayesian approach is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method based on the Gibbs 
Sampler. This is a data augmenting procedure which provides the linkage between the 
discrete dependent variable and it’s latent continuous counterpart. We refer the reader to 
Lesage (2000) and Fleming (2004) for a complete presentation of the method. A general 
introduction to the Gibbs sampler can be found in Casella and George (1992). The Gibbs 
sampler introduces a conditional distribution for the censored variable conditional on all other 
parameters in the model. This distribution is used to produce a random draw for each value of 
the dependent variable in the probit specification. Once a sample for the unobserved latent 
dependent variable is established, the problem reduces to the linear spatial auto-regressive 
model which can be estimated with traditional ML methods. The Bayesian approach allows 
for heteroskedastic error terms even after controlling for spatial dependence, ensuring that 
parameter inconsistency is not driven by heteroskedastic influences (Fleming 2004: 156). This 
allows (4) to be generalized as: 
 
 2 1 2(0, ),  ( , ,..., )u nN diag v v vσ =u V V∼ . (8) 
 
Technically the Gibbs sampler proceeds as follows: 
 
                                                 
3 The analysis is carried out using James Lesage’s spatial econometric toolbox in the Matlab environment and 
Tim Thomas’ corrected scripts (Lesage, 2003 and Thomas, 2005). 
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1. Start with arbitrary initial values for the parameter vector: 
( )2 1 2 1 2, , , ,..., , , ,...,u k nv v vσ ρ β β β .  
2. Estimate 2uσ  given all other parameters and the data. 
3. Estimate 1 2( , ,..., )kβ β β  given all other parameters and the data. 
4. Estimate ( )1 2, ,..., nv v v  given all other parameters and the data. 
5. Estimate ρ  given all other parameters and the data. 
6. Sample the conditional distribution for the latent variable (dptax*) given all parameter 
values.  
 
This completes one pass of the Gibbs sampler process.4 The Gibbs sampler process is then 
repeated a large number of times to derive conditional distributions for all the parameters. The 
mean of the conditional distribution is the final parameter estimate and the standard deviation 
of the distribution is used for inference. All MCMC sampling procedures reported below are 
based on 10000 draws with the first 2000 draws omitted. The first draws are omitted to allow 
the sampler to achieve a steady-state (the so called ‘burn-in period’). Note that estimates 
based on 1000 draws with the first 200 draws omitted were close to identical to the reported 
estimates, suggesting that one need not carry out an excessive number of draws in practice. 
Note that we need to fix one of the unknown parameters in order to identify the other 
unknowns in the model (Holloway et al. 2002:394). We adopt the usual practice and fix 2uσ  
equal to unity.  
 
An observed spatial pattern in property taxation is not necessarily due to competition among 
local governments. Also common shocks and unobserved correlates will appear as spatial 
auto-correlation. In empirical work it is a challenge to separate the spatial auto-regressive 
probit (SARP) model from the spatial error probit model. With spatially correlated omitted 
variables, we have a pattern of spatial error of the form: 
 
 = +u λMu ε , (9) 
 
                                                 
4 Lesage (2000) has derived all the conditional distributions for the limited dependent Bayesian spatial models 
and it is this sampling procedure that is used to obtain parameter estimates.  
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where ε is a well behaved error term and M is a neighbor matrix. Estimating the SARP model 
introduced above can in principle lead to a false conclusion of fiscal competition (ρ>0) when 
ρ=0 holds in the true model. The ability to separate spatial lag from spatial error depends on 
the quality of the other explanatory variables in (3).5  
 
The error structure offers some information about the type of fiscal competition at work. If 
yardstick competition is the driving force behind spatial auto-correlation, an error structure 
like (9) may appear if voters have a reasonable knowledge of the deterministic factors 
affecting taxation in neighboring local governments. Bordignon et al. (2003) argue that 
yardstick competition is likely to show up as spatial error because the spatial lag model 
implicitly assumes that tax rates are spatially correlated independently of the levels of the Xs, 
while the spatial error model tests for correlation of the tax rates which cannot be explained 
by the other Xs. In section 5 we estimate both the spatial lag and the spatial error model and 
compare which model which best fit the data. 
 
In section 6 we present an extension of the spatial probit analysis and have a look at the 
determination of the property tax revenue. The endogenous variable here is the annual 
property tax payment for a standard house (ptax). The latent spatial tobit specification is given 
by:  
 
 ρ= + +ptax* Wptax* xβ ε . (10) 
 
The observed dependent variable, ptaxi, is equal to ptaxi* if ptaxi*>0 and 0 otherwise. In 
section 6 we present results for both the non-spatial and the Bayesian spatial tobit model (both 
lag and error specification).  
 
5. The discrete choice of having property taxes 
 
The benchmark analysis looks at characteristics of the local governments important to explain 
the existence of the property tax, ignoring the spatial dimension. Specification A in Table 1 
presents the results for the standard non-spatial probit model. The fiscal demand variables 
                                                 
5 Anselin et al. (1996) have proposed some LM tests to separate spatial error from spatial lag, but these are not 
implementable in the discrete endogenous variable case.  
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included are private income level and central government grants. The likelihood of having 
property tax decreases with the level of private income. The effect is statistically significant 
and quantitatively important. Evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables, one standard 
deviation increase in private income reduces the probability of levying property tax with 
approximately 20 percentage points. Since private income represents both a demand effect 
and is an indicator of the local tax base, the negative coefficient shows that the tax base effect 
dominates. In the demand framework, higher private income is expected to lead to higher 
demand for local public services and having property tax is a way of arranging additional 
revenue. Central government grants have no statistically significant effect.  
 
Political fragmentation (measured by the Herfindahl index, HERF) is also shown to influence 
the choice of property taxation. Higher value of the index means less party fragmentation of 
the local council. The negative coefficient implies that increased party fragmentation is 
associated with higher likelihood of having property taxation. The quantitative effect is of 
political importance. Evaluated at the mean, one standard deviation increase in party 
fragmentation increases the likelihood of having property tax by about 5.7 percentage points. 
In our setting the result is consistent with the understanding that political fragmentation 
motivates property taxation. The party fragmentation of the local council motivates the 
introduction of property taxation to improve the incentives of the officials of the local 
government. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The positive relationship between political fragmentation and likelihood of having property 
taxation may be interpreted in a different context. The studies of political fragmentation and 
fiscal policy innovated by Roubini and Sachs (1989) emphasize political fragmentation as a 
source of fiscal inefficiency. Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) argue that political 
fragmentation may lead to excessive government and consequently a high tax level. In the 
Norwegian context, Kalseth and Rattsø (1998) were the first to show that political 
fragmentation in local governments has economic effects, in their data they found excessive 
administrative spending in fragmented councils. Borge (1995) find that political 
fragmentation is associated with higher level of user charges. In this understanding our 
relationship between fragmentation and property taxation may reflect 'political strength'. A 
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strong political leadership may be better able to hold down the tax (and spending) level. The 
separation between these two explanations is addressed below. 
 
The choice of property taxation also seems to be an ideological issue. The share of socialists 
in the local council is an important predictor of property taxation. More socialists increase the 
likelihood of having property taxation. The size of the effect is quite large. When the share of 
socialists increase by 10 percentage points, the likelihood of having property tax increases by 
14 percentage points. The average socialist share is 37%, and one standard deviation increase 
raises the likelihood by about 18 percentage points. The result is consistent with the results of 
Borge and Rattsø (2004), who study the socialist influence in a model focused on the role of 
income distribution for the tax structure. Petterson (2004) has shown a similar effect of 
socialist orientation on the tax level in a Swedish study using the discontinuity method to 
compare local governments close to 50% socialists. 
 
The model is extended to include the existence of property taxation in neighboring 
communities. The geographical distribution of the use of residential property taxation as a 
local tax shows a clear pattern. The distribution follows to some extent the rural-urban 
dimension. But we also find significant differences across counties that hardly can be 
explained by rurality. As an example we note that none of the municipalities in Vestfold or 
Akershus counties levy residential property taxation (see Appendix Table 2).  The counties 
are close to Oslo and most of the local governments have a high private income level.  
 
To take into account strategic interaction among neighboring governments we extend model 
A to include a spatially lagged dependent variable. The extended formulations are shown in 
models B and C in Table 1. Model B is a straightforward Probit estimation, ignoring 
simultaneity, while model C is based on the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) technique 
outlined in section 4. We find that fiscal competition certainly is important to explain the 
existence of property taxation. The statistical effect is solid in both model B and C. The 
marginal effect of fiscal competition is overstated when we ignore the inherent simultaneity 
problem, comparing models B and C. While the naïve Probit estimation finds an estimated 
reaction function coefficient ( ρˆ ) of 1.72, the MCMC technique estimate is 0.22. The 
marginal effects are 0.56 and 0.07, respectively, evaluated at the sample averages for the 
explanatory variables. 
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While the fiscal competition is clearly confirmed in both specifications, the difference in 
economic impact between the two is substantial. The simultaneous latent formulation 
indicates that the likelihood that a local government will levy property taxation increases with 
2 percentage points if one additional neighbor starts levying property taxation (assuming 4 
neighbors). This is hardly of economic importance. The corresponding effect for the naïve 
probit is 13.5 percentage points, which must be considered to be economically relevant. The 
difference is expected on methodological grounds. In the naïve model B it is assumed that 
local governments take into account the observed property taxation of the neighbors, with a 
stark difference between those with and those without property taxation. In the latent model C 
formulation, the local governments take into account the predicted likelihood of having 
property taxation of the neighbors. This likelihood will show much less variation between 
local governments, and consequently the interaction effect will be much smaller. When the 
fiscal competition is a marginal effect, the endogeneity problem is not expected to seriously 
bias the estimates, and the model B estimate may be the best estimate of the interaction. A 
more conservative approach is to consider ˆMCMCρ  to be a lower bound and the ˆMLρ to be an 
upper bound of the true ρ .6 
 
For completeness we also estimate the spatial error model, reported as specification D in 
Table 1. Again we find evidence of a geographic pattern in the property taxation decision. 
According to the Pseudo-R2, the fit of the model is somewhat lower when we rely on the 
spatial error rather than spatial lag specification.  
 
Different econometric strategies have been used in previous studies to disentangle spatial 
auto-correlation driven by tax base mobility and yardstick competition. All studies point to 
the latter as the most likely source of observed tax mimicking. Besley and Case (1995) find 
that the probability for a US state governor to be re-elected decreases as state taxes rise, and 
increases with the tax rises in neighboring states. While Bordignon et al (2003) find that 
property tax rate interdependence in Italy is present only when mayors can run for reelection 
and are not backed by strong majorities. Finally, Allers and Elhorst (2005) study strategic 
interaction in property tax setting in Dutch municipalities and find that interaction is weaker 
when the electoral margin is high. If tax base mobility was the driving force behind spatial 
                                                 
6 Allers and Elhorst (2005) summarize the previous research on tax mimicking and conclude that the estimated 
neighborhood effect typically ranges from 0.2 to 0.6. All of these studies rely on continuous dependent variables.  
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autocorrelation, we would observe this irrespective of term limits and electoral margins. We 
conclude that with limited mobility of the property tax base in Norway an observed spatial 
pattern is likely to be due to yardstick competition. We cannot rule out that omitted spatially 
correlated variables are an important part of the spatial auto-correlation, but our set of control 
variables do include the factors shown to be of importance in other studies of local taxation in 
Norway. 
 
Ignoring spatial dependence generally leads non-spatial models to attribute spatial 
autocorrelation in the dependent variable to explanatory variables rather than assign this 
variation to spatial dependence. This can potentially yield seriously biased effects in non-
spatial models. We find that this is not the case for the discrete choice of property taxation. 
Comparing model A to model C we find that all coefficient are only slightly underestimated 
in the non-spatial probit model.7  
 
6. The determinants of property tax revenue 
 
It is of interest to investigate whether the fiscal competition influences the level of property 
taxation in the local governments. As a starting point we have had a look at the demand 
determinants of the standardized property tax revenue in a simple OLS among the 103 local 
governments with property taxation (not reported). Central government grants come out as the 
main determinant of the property tax revenue. Higher grants induce local governments to 
reduce the property tax level given that they have property taxation. This revenue substitution 
is the standard result in this kind of studies (see Borge and Rattsø, 2004). The private income 
level has a negative effect on the property tax level. We interpret this as the effect of higher 
property tax base associated with higher personal income. No political variables have any 
statistically significant effect on the property tax level given that they have property taxation. 
It seems that only economic variables influence the size of the property tax revenue given 
property taxation. 
 
                                                 
7 The marginal effects do not vary greatly between the spatial and the non-spatial probit. A one standard 
deviation increase in the Herfindahl index is in specification C is estimated to reduce the probability of property 
taxation with approximately 0.07, while a one standard deviation increase in the socialist share increases the 
probability with 0.22. 
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In the combined tobit analysis of the propensity to have property taxation and the level of 
property tax revenue both economic and political determinants are important. The benchmark 
tobit analysis without spatial interaction is reported as model E in Table 2. Political 
fragmentation is shown to be an important determinant of the property tax revenue. The 
property tax level goes down when the local council is less fragmented. Since political 
fragmentation has no effect in an OLS estimation among local governments with property 
taxation, but has statistically significant effect in the tobit formulation, we conclude that 
political fragmentation first and for all is important for the choice to have property taxation or 
not. This is consistent with the interpretation that political fragmentation motivates having 
property taxation as an incentive mechanism. We also find statistically significant effects of 
political ideology and private income level.  
 
Moving on to the spatial tobit specifications we find that property tax revenue certainly is 
affected by fiscal competition. The average property tax revenue is about NOK 1000 (USD 
150) per standardized house. The estimated neighborhood effects in models F, G and H in 
Table 2, are statistically and economically significant. Again, we find as expected that 
ignoring simultaneity yields an upward bias in the estimated strategic interaction. Based on 
the MCMC technique we find an interaction coefficient based on the spatial lag specification 
of 0.22. The spatial error specification suggests an interaction coefficient of 0.32. The 
estimates implies that when neighboring local governments increase their property taxation 
with NOK 1000 per house, then the local government under study increases the property 
taxation with NOK 220 or 320 according to model formulation. This is an estimated reaction 
function coefficient of the same magnitude as other European studies of property tax 
interaction have found. Utilizing a spatial error model Bordignon et al (2003) find a 
coefficient of 0.30 on Italian data while Allers and Elhorst (2005) hinging on the spatial lag 
specification and find a coefficient of 0.35 on Dutch data. Both these studies analyze property 
tax decisions in a continuous setting. We interpret the highly statistical significant evidence of 
spatial auto-correlation provided in table 2 as evidence that local governments look to their 
geographic neighbors when making property tax decisions. As in the probit case, we find that 
the estimated effects of the other Xs are not sensitive to controlling for spatial auto-
correlation.  
 
Table 2 about here 
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7. Concluding remarks 
 
The starting point of the paper is the recent interest in decentralization with property taxation 
as an incentive mechanism to stimulate efficient resource use in the public sector. Local 
governments in Norway can choose to have residential property tax, and their choice can 
inform us about the importance of the incentives involved – fiscal competition and property 
value feedback. The standard demand model assumes that property taxes are determined 
based on the economic tradeoff between the benefit of more services and the cost of higher 
taxes. Two additional aspects of the discrete choice of having property taxation are 
investigated, the roles of fiscal competition and political fragmentation. We test the 
hypothesis that fragmentation and competition influence the decision to have property 
taxation. Econometric challenges of spatial models with discrete dependent variables are 
addressed.  
 
The empirical results indicate that fiscal competition generates a distinct geographic pattern in 
local taxation and that fragmentation motivates property taxation to control the associated 
common pool problems. The fiscal competition is consistent with the strategic interaction 
expected with yardstick competition. In an extension of the analysis we show that fiscal 
competition and fragmentation also is important for the property tax level. More fragmented 
local councils in an area where many local governments have property taxation contribute to 
higher property tax level. The quantitative effect of the fiscal interaction depends on model 
formulation, and it is a challenge for future research to discriminate between alternative 
econometric representations of fiscal competition with discrete dependent variable.  
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Table 1: Probit analysis of fiscal competition in property taxation 
 A B C D 
Dependent variable dptax dptax dptax* dptax* 
 Coeff t-prob Marginal effect Coeff t-prob Marginal effect Coeff p-value Marginal effect Coeff p-value Marginal effect 
SPATIAL LAG (ρ)    1.72 0.00 0.56 0.22 0.00 0.07    
SPATIAL ERROR (λ)          0.32 0.01 0.10 
HERF -2.93 0.10 -0.96 -2.98 0.11 -0.97 -3.69 0.04 -1.20 -4.13 0.05 -1.35 
y  -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 
G 0.05 0.19 0.01 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.31 0.01 
SOC 4.34 0.00 1.41 3.78 0.00 1.23 5.16 0.00 1.69 5.20 0.00 1.70 
my
y  -2.70 0.39 -0.88 -2.47 0.46 -0.81 -3.37 0.20 -1.10 -2.69 0.28 -0.88 
POPULATION 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.01 0.29 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00 
CH 24.94 0.10 8.14 38.49 0.02 12.56 37.53 0.02 12.25 28.47 0.08 9.29 
YO -12.78 0.24 -4.17 -17.34 0.12 -5.66 -14.73 0.14 -4.81 -18.04 0.12 -5.89 
EL 6.56 0.23 2.14 9.38 0.10 3.06 11.61 0.05 3.79 6.15 0.22 2.01 
RURAL -3.47 0.00 -1.13 -3.85 0.00 -1.26 -4.47 0.00 -1.46 -4.54 0.00 -1.48 
McFadden R2 0.29 0.35   
Pseudo R2   0.66 0.65 
Log likelihood -138.13 -126.41   
Model Probit Spatial lag probit Spatial lag probit Spatial error probit 
Estimation method ML ML, exogenous lag MCMC, endogenous lag MCMC, endogenous error 
Number of draws   10000 10000 
Number of draws omitted   2000 2000 
# obs. 301 301 301 301 
# positive obs. 105 105 105 105 
Note: A constant term is included in all regressions (not reported). Marginal effects are evaluated at sample averages of the explanatory variables. 
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Table 2: Tobit analysis of fiscal competition in property taxation 
 E F G H 
Dependent variable ptax ptax ptax* ptax* 
 Coeff p-level Coeff p-level Coeff p-level Coeff p-level 
SPATIAL LAG (ρ)   0.69 0.03 0.22 0.01   
SPATIAL ERROR (λ)       0.32 0.00 
HERF -4913.05 0.06 -4561.97 0.08 -5062.22 0.03 -5582.28 0.03 
y  -46.51 0.00 -40.73 0.00 -47.47 0.00 -49.07 0.00 
G 9.92 0.84 5.60 0.91 -3.60 0.47 -26.39 0.35 
SOC 6882.03 0.00 6195.67 0.00 6903.96 0.00 6741.48 0.00 
my
y  -6408.41 0.18 -4431.92 0.36 -8301.06 0.07 -7642.19 0.11 
POPULATION 7.87 0.24 7.58 0.25 9.18 0.10 7.18 0.15 
CH 34667.99 0.14 46806.54 0.05 49889.68 0.02 43711.70 0.05 
YO -17859.71 0.28 -20570.20 0.21 -25998.32 0.08 -35610.17 0.04 
EL 7689.52 0.36 9823.67 0.24 9620.42 0.14 2064.66 0.42 
RURAL -5252.45 0.00 -5297.45 0.00 -5894.90 0.00 -6175.61 0.00 
McFadden R2     
Pseudo R2   0.544 0.548 
Log likelihood -1016.73 -1014.43   
Model Tobit Spatial lag tobit Spatial lag tobit Spatial error tobit 
Estimation method ML ML, exogenous lag MCMC, endogenous lag MCMC, endogenous error 
Number of draws   10000 10000 
Number of draws omitted   2000 2000 
# obs. 301 301 301 301 
# positive obs. 105 105 105 105 
Note: A constant term is included in all regressions (not reported).  
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Appendix Table 1 
Population 
size 
Share of 
municipalities with 
dptax = 1 
Number of 
municipalities 
Average 
ptax 
Average ptax 
for dtpax=1 
<2500 0.02 130 43 2150 
>2500 & 
<5000 
0.23 112 355 1543 
>5000 & 
<10000 
0.39 90 679 1741 
>10000 0.44 99 911 2070 
Overall 0.25 431 456 1824 
Note: 108 out of 431 observations levy residential property taxation. Only 3 out of 130 
municipalities with a population size below 2500 levy residential property taxation.  
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Appendix Table 2: Data description and descriptive statistics – Mean and standard 
deviations  
Variable Description Mean St.dev Min Max 
PTAX Annual property tax payment for a 
standard house, NOK. 634.88 991.84 0.00 4312.00
DPTAX Dummy taking the value 1 for local 
governments levying residential 
property tax 
0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
W_DPTAX Spatially lagged DPTAX, interpreted as 
the share of neighbors with residential 
property taxation. 
0.26 0.22 0.00 1.00 
HERF Herfindahl-index measuring political 
fragmentation of the local council. 0.24 0.06 0.14 0.60 
Y Average before tax income for every 
person 17 years and older, measured in 
1000 NOK.   
224.26 24.14 170.00 341.60 
G The sum of lump-sum grants from the 
central government and regulated 
income and wealth taxes, measured in 
1000 NOK per capita.   
23.88 3.32 18.64 35.44 
SOC The share of socialist representatives in 
the local council. A socialist is defined 
as a representative belonging to one of 
the following parties: NKP, RV, SV and 
AP.  
0.37 0.13 0.05 0.72 
POPULATION Total population in thousands (1st of 
January).   12.56 20.19 2.52 230.95 
CH The share of the population 0-5 years 
(1st of January).   0.08 0.01 0.05 0.11 
YO The share of the population 6-15 years 
(1st of January). 0.14 0.01 0.10 0.19 
EL The share of the population 67 years 
and above (1st of January). 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.23 
my
y  
Income distribution measured as the 
ratio of median to mean income, based 
on before tax income.  
0.90 0.04 0.73 1.00 
RURAL The share of the population living in 
rural areas (3rd of November) 0.41 0.23 0.01 1.00 
Data description is based on the local governments with population>2500 (N=301).  
 
Documentation of the variables: The data used in this analysis are provided by 
Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Statistics Norway and Arne Sauar. None of 
them are responsible for the analyses conducted or for the conclusions drawn.  
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Appendix Table 3 – Frequency of property taxation on county level 
County Overall Population>2500 
 Municipalities 
with ptax 
Municipalities 
without ptax 
Average 
ptax 
Municipalities 
with ptax 
Municipalities 
without ptax 
Average 
ptax 
Østfold 4 14 566 4 12 637 
Akershus 0 22 0 0 22 0 
Hedmark 10 12 782 9 7 988 
Oppland 13 13 914 13 8 1132 
Buskerud 4 17 179 4 13 221 
Vestfold 0 14 0 0 13 0 
Telemark 10 8 1212 10 3 1677 
Aust-
Agder 2 13 249 2 6 466 
Vest-
Agder 2 13 280 2 8 420 
Rogaland 9 17 561 9 12 695 
Hordaland 6 27 299 6 19 407 
Sogn og 
Fjordane 6 20 355 5 13 379 
Møre og 
Romsdal 6 30 336 6 22 413 
Sør-
Trøndelag 5 20 332 5 14 437 
Nord-
Trøndelag 5 19 578 5 8 1067 
Nordland 11 34 494 11 8 1171 
Troms 7 18 402 7 5 838 
Finnmark 8 11 629 7 3 1020 
Overall 108 323 458 105 196 635 
 
